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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Interim State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DANIEL JOSEPH SMITH,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)
Nature of the Case

NO. 43706
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-3098
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Daniel Smith asks the Idaho Court of Appeals to rehear this case, as he submits
the opinion, 2016 Opinion No.55 (Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2016) (hereinafter, Opinion), which
affirms, inter alia, the order denying his motion for counsel on his motion for sentence
reduction pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b) (hereinafter, Rule 35), is inconsistent with Idaho
Supreme Court precedent in two respects. First, he contends it did not address one of
the arguments actually raised on appeal, and so, is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme
Court’s decision in Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 328 (2008) (“This Court would
be delinquent in its duties if it failed to address the actual issues on appeal . . . .”).
Second, he contends the ultimate holding of the Opinion – that his Rule 35 motion was
frivolous – is inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Wersland,
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125 Idaho 499, 504-05 (1994), and State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 223 (2008). Both
those decisions involved information similar to what Mr. Smith presented with his
motion, and the Supreme Court explained that information fulfilled the requirement that
a Rule 35 motion be accompanied by new or additional information. For either reason,
this Court should grant rehearing in this case.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The district court had imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three
years fixed, and refused to retain jurisdiction following Mr. Smith’s plea of guilty to
possession of methamphetamine.1 (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-20.)2 Mr. Smith sought to file a Rule
35 motion asking for leniency, and he requested the assistance of counsel to help him
prepare and present that motion. (R., pp.131-40, 159-60.)
Mr. Smith was particularly concerned that, during the sentencing hearing, the
district court considered the fact that “he engaged in reckless activity which resulted in
certain sexually transmitted diseases, actually a number of them, and I found myself
wondering between 2014 and his current arrest how many others were inflicted [sic] by
this reckless behavior,” as an aggravating factor.3 (Tr., p.18, Ls.14-19; R., pp.142-43.)
As such, Mr. Smith sought to present information in his Rule 35 motion to demonstrate
that the district court’s concern was unfounded: that, since being first diagnosed with
The district court also imposed a concurrent sentence of 180 days on a misdemeanor
charge of resisting arrest. (Tr., p.20, Ls.7-9.)
2 While the transcripts in this case are provided in two separately bound and paginated
volumes, all references to “Tr.” herein are to the volume containing the transcript of the
sentencing hearing held on October 1, 2015.
3 The Presentence Investigation (hereinafter, PSI) had mentioned Mr. Smith’s behavior
during that time in the context of Mr. Smith concluding, upon reflection following
his diagnosis in 2015, that was the time during which he likely had become infected with
HIV. (PSI, p.12.)
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HIV, “I have followed the recommendations of my doctors, have taken steps to prevent
further spread of the disease, am correctly medicated and am continuing proper
treatment recommended by health professionals.” (R., p.143.)
Mr. Smith also wanted to address the district court’s concern over his prior
struggles with rehabilitative programming.

(See Tr., p.18, Ls.18-12.)

As such, he

sought to present additional information about his amenability to treatment: that his
diagnosis combined with his brother’s suicide during the brother’s own relapse the day
Mr. Smith had been arrested had “a profound impact on my attitude and outlook on life.
I have never been more determined to turn my back on a lifestyle that has cost myself
and my family so much.” (R., p.144.)
Finally, he was concerned that the district court had exceeded the prosecutor’s
recommendations for sentencing. (See R., p.142.) In exchange for Mr. Smith’s guilty
plea, the prosecutor had agreed to recommend a unified sentence of seven years, with
two years fixed, and to recommend that the district court retain jurisdiction. (See, e.g.,
Tr., p.6, Ls.5-7.) As such, Mr. Smith asked the district court to reduce his sentence so
that it conformed to the prosecutor’s recommendations. (See R., p.146.)
The district court denied Mr. Smith’s motion for appointment of counsel on his
Rule 35 motion, concluding the motion was frivolous: “it appears a reasonable person
with adequate means would not be willing to retain counsel at his or her own expense to
conduct a further investigation into Defendant’s claims.” (R., p.160.) It then proceeded
to deny his motion on the merits without a hearing. (R., pp.161-65.) Specifically, it
explained that, because the current case represented Mr. Smith’s fourth felony
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conviction, and because he had struggled with prior rehabilitative opportunities, the
sentence as originally imposed was appropriate. (R., p.164.)
By the time the district court entered its order denying his Rule 35 motion,
Mr. Smith had already filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
(See R., pp.149-52.) On appeal, he argued that, because Rule 35 is a critical stage of
the criminal process, counsel was needed to do more than just investigate his claims.
(App. Br., pp.5, 9-10.) Thus, he contended counsel should have been appointed to help
him present his Rule 35 motion, which was not frivolous because there was new or
additional information in two respects. (App. Br., pp.6-8.)
First, he explained the information about his efforts to reduce his risk of
spreading his disease had not been before the district court at the sentencing hearing,
and, based on that information, the district court’s concern about spreading his disease
was unfounded.

(App. Br., p.7.)

Second, he argued that he presented new or

additional information about the change in his amenability to treatment by explaining the
effects of the combination of his diagnosis and his brother’s recent suicide changed his
amenability to treatment. (App. Br., p.8.)
The State responded that Mr. Smith had been aware of this information at the
time of the sentencing hearing. (Resp. Br., pp.3-4.) As a result, relying on this Court’s
decision in State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1994), the State argued that,
because Mr. Smith had not presented that information at the sentencing hearing, he
could not now base his Rule 35 motion on that information. (See Resp. Br., pp.3-4.)
Mr. Smith replied that, in subsequent decisions such as State v. Person, 145
Idaho 293 (Ct. App. 2007), this Court explained the Wade rule was limited to situations
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where the defendant had stipulated to a particular sentence recommendation as part of
a plea agreement. (Reply Br., pp.3-6.) Because Mr. Smith had not stipulated to such a
recommendation, he argued Wade was inapplicable to his case. (Reply Br., pp.3-6.)
Rather, he argued his case was similar to Idaho Supreme Court decisions, such as
State v. Wersland and State v. Arthur, in which the Idaho Supreme Court explained that
information similar to that Mr. Smith had presented with his motion constituted new or
additional information in the Rule 35 context. (Reply Br., pp.5-6.)
This Court concluded that “[t]he crux of [Mr.] Smith’s Rule 35 motion is that
certain circumstances, i.e., his disease and his brother’s suicide, have made him
amenable to treatment.” (Opinion, p.3.) Because this Court concluded the district court
had been aware of the individual facts – that Mr. Smith had been diagnosed with HIV
and that his brother had committed suicide – and that the district court had considered
Mr. Smith’s amenability to treatment when imposing sentence, this Court concluded his
Rule 35 motion was frivolous. (Opinion, p.3.) As a result, this Court affirmed the order
denying Mr. Smith’s motion for appointment of counsel. (Opinion, p.3.) It then held the
district court had not abused its discretion by denying Mr. Smith’s motion on its merits.
(Opinion, p.4.) The Opinion did not address the argument about whether Mr. Smith
could properly base his Rule 35 motion on the information about his behavior upon
receiving his diagnosis, of which he had been aware, but which had not been before the
district court, at sentencing. (See generally Opinion.)
Mr. Smith filed a petition for rehearing timely from the issuance of the Opinion.
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ISSUE
Whether this Court should grant rehearing to address the arguments actually raised in
this appeal because, otherwise, the Opinion is inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court
precedent.
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ARGUMENT
This Court Should Grant Rehearing To Address The Arguments Actually Raised In This
Appeal Because, Otherwise, The Opinion Is Inconsistent With Idaho Supreme Court
Precedent
A.

Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Rehearing
Idaho Appellate Rule 116, which governs petitions for rehearing before the Idaho

Court of Appeal, provides: “Any party to a proceeding aggrieved by opinion or order of
the Court of Appeals may thereafter petition to that court for a rehearing in the same
manner, within the same time limits, upon the same grounds, and with the same effect
as a petition for rehearing to the Supreme Court under the Appellate Rules.” I.A.R. 116.
Idaho Appellate Rule 42 governs petitions for rehearing in the Idaho Supreme Court, but
it does not identify the grounds for granting such petitions. See I.A.R. 42. However,
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b), which governs petitions for review to the Supreme Court,
provides that such petitions may be granted in the Court’s discretion “when there are
special and important reasons” for doing so. I.A.R. 118(b). It also identifies five factors
which should be considered in making that decision. Id. Since petitions for rehearing
and review serve similar policy goals, the criteria for granting petitions for review set
forth in Rule 118(b) should apply equally to petitions for rehearing.
Accordingly, Mr. Smith contends that the decision whether to grant his petition for
rehearing lies within the sound discretion of this Court, but that his petition should be
granted because there are special and important reasons for doing so. Specifically, he
asserts the Opinion fails to address one of the arguments raised on appeal and, as a
result, is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Lovitt v. Robideaux.
Additionally, he contends the ultimate holding – that his Rule 35 motion was frivolous –
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is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Wersland and
State v. Arthur.
B.

The Opinion Did Not Address One Of The Issues Actually Raised On Appeal
The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that “[t]his Court would be delinquent in its

duties if it failed to address the actual issues on appeal . . . .” Lovitt, 139 Idaho at 328.
The Opinion in this case focused on only one of the arguments raised on appeal –
whether Mr. Smith presented new or additional information about his amenability to
treatment, in that it was higher than it had been before due to his recent HIV diagnosis
combined with his brother’s recent suicide.

(Opinion, p.3.)

This Court held that,

because the district court was aware of the independent facts at the time of sentencing,
none of it was new or additional information before the court.

(Opinion, p.3.)

Additionally, it held that, being aware of that information, the district court had already
considered the issue at “the crux” of Mr. Smith’s motion. (Opinion, p.3.)
However, that was only one of the arguments Mr. Smith raised on appeal. His
other argument was that his Rule 35 motion was not frivolous because he had
presented information which had not been before the district court at the sentencing
hearing about his efforts to reduce his risk of spreading his disease, contradicting the
concern the district court had voiced and relied upon at the sentencing hearing. (App.
Br., p.7.) The State’s response to that argument was that he could not base his motion
on that information even though it had not been before the district court at sentencing
because:
All of this was information that was in [Mr.] Smith’s and his counsel’s
possession at the time of sentencing (in October 2015) and, as such, was
not new or additional information. See Wade, 125 Idaho at 526, 873 P.2d
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at 171 (information in the possession of defendant and counsel at the time
of sentencing “is not new or additional information” when later submitted in
support of a Rule 35 motion for sentence reduction).
(Resp. Br., p.3.) Mr. Smith replied that Wade was inapplicable to the facts of his case
and the Idaho Supreme Court has previously found similar information could satisfy the
requirements of Rule 35.

(Reply Br., pp.5-6 (citing Arthur, 145 Idaho at 223 and

Wersland, 125 Idaho at 504-05).) In fact, as this issue dominated both the Response
and Reply Briefs, it, and not the issue about the change in his amenability to treatment,
was the “crux” of the arguments on appeal. (Compare Opinion, p.3.)
The analysis in the Opinion does not address this other issue. For example, the
fact that the district court was aware of Mr. Smith’s diagnosis does not show that its
concern about Mr. Smith’s behavior in light of that diagnosis was proper. Similarly, the
conclusion that the district court considered Mr. Smith’s amenability to treatment does
not tend to show that the information Mr. Smith presented to refute the district court’s
concern about his behavior in light of his diagnosis had been before the district court at
sentencing.
Since the Opinion has not addressed the issues which had actually been raised
on appeal, it is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Lovitt. As such,
this Court should grant rehearing in this case.
C.

The Ultimate Conclusion That Mr. Smith’s Motion Is Frivolous Is Inconsistent
With Idaho Supreme Court Precedent
The Opinion affirmed the order dismissing Mr. Smith’s request for counsel based

on its conclusion that his motion was frivolous. (Opinion, p.3.) However, as noted
supra, the Idaho Supreme Court has found similar information will satisfy the
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requirements for Rule 35 motions. That means, when a Rule 35 motion is accompanied
by such information, it is not frivolous.
For example, in State v. Wersland, the defendant presented information that her
husband had been undergoing mental health care for two years prior to her sentencing
hearing and that his condition had been exacerbated by the sentencing decision.
Wersland, 125 Idaho at 504. The Idaho Supreme Court held the district court properly
weighed that “new information regarding the mental and emotional health of Wersland’s
husband,” in deciding to deny the defendant’s request for leniency. Id. at 505. As such,
even though the fact of diagnosis was known the defendant prior to sentencing, the
defendant still fulfilled the requirements of Rule 35 when she presented theretounpresented information about that diagnosis with her motion.
Similarly, in State v. Arthur, the defendant “present[ed] new information to the
district court that he was seriously ill” and he “submitted medical records showing his
current medical status and the care he was receiving for his terminal illness while
incarcerated.”4 Arthur, 145 Idaho at 221, 223. The Supreme Court concluded, “Arthur
supported his Rule 35 motion with additional information.” Id. at 223. Because the
information he presented about his diagnosis and treatment was new to the district
court, it was sufficient to be the basis for a reduction of his sentence pursuant to
Rule 35. Id.
Similarly, Mr. Smith presented information about his diagnosis and treatment –
that, upon receiving his diagnosis, he had made efforts to adhere to this doctors’

The Arthur Opinion is not clear as to whether this information referred to a new
diagnosis made after sentencing, or just that the defendant was receiving new treatment
while in custody. See generally Arthur, 145 Idaho 219.
4
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recommendations to reduce his risk of spreading his disease – and that information had
not been before the district court at sentencing. As such, the information he proffered in
support of his motion was sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 35, which means
his motion was not frivolous.
Additionally, at a more fundamental level, if the district court relies on a concern
at sentencing, but that concern is based on an inaccurate understanding of the relevant
facts, a reasonable person would undoubtedly be willing to hire counsel to pursue a
motion to reconsider the sentence based upon a clarification of the relevant facts, which
means such a motion is not frivolous. That is precisely the sort of argument Mr. Smith
sought to pursue, and he presented heretofore-unpresented information to clarify the
relevant facts.
Because the Opinion’s ultimate conclusion – that Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion was
frivolous – is inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court precedent, this Court should grant
rehearing in this case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests this Court grant rehearing in this case. Assuming
it does so, he further requests it grant relief for the reasons set forth in the appellate
briefs.
DATED this 12th day of September, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of September, 2016, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed
to:
DANIEL JOSEPH SMITH
INMATE #69623
NCWC
1640 11TH AVENUE NORTH
NAMPA ID 83687
SAMUEL A HOAGLAND
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas
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